Scapegoating Levies For Security Failures In Balochistan

The Balochistan Levies Force, a cost-effective and trusted security force, is being unfairly scapegoated. Merging it with the police would be costly and ineffective

Scapegoating Levies For Security Failures In Balochistan

Last week, Chief Minister Balochistan stirred controversy by announcing that the Balochistan Levies Force would be merged into the Police. This move has sparked concerns and debates across the province. Fueling this narrative, a news anchor falsely claimed that the Levies consume a staggering Rs92 billion, a number that, in reality, is the combined budget of all law enforcement agencies in Balochistan. This misleading information further added confusion to an already delicate issue. At the heart of this move lies a dangerous trend: scapegoating the Levies Force for the security failures in the province.

To understand the role of Levies, one must first understand how law enforcement is structured in Balochistan. Administratively, the province is divided into “A” and “B” areas. The urban centers fall under “A” areas and are managed by the police. In contrast, rural regions are classified as “B” areas and fall under the jurisdiction of the Balochistan Levies. Interestingly, while police control just 18 percent of the landmass, mostly cities and towns, the Levies operate in the remaining 82 percent of Balochistan’s vast and often challenging terrain. This alone shows how crucial the Levies are in maintaining law and order in most parts of the province.

The Levies were established in the late 19th century by the British Raj as a local community police force. Over the years, they have become a trusted security force in rural areas. Critics often say that Levies are controlled by tribal chiefs. While that may have been true during colonial times, it is no longer the case. Today, the Levies operate under the administrative control of the Deputy Commissioners (DCs), who are government-appointed officers from either the federal or provincial civil services. The DCs, in turn, report to the provincial government. There is no institutional space for Sardars to influence operational decisions anymore, yet this old stereotype is repeatedly used to discredit the force.

This is not the first time the idea of merging Levies into police has been floated. In 2002, during General Pervez Musharraf’s regime, the Levies were merged with the police, and the entire province was declared an “A” area. The cost of this experiment exceeded Rs5 billion. But despite this massive financial injection, the security situation did not improve. Recognising the failure of this policy, Nawab Aslam Raisani’s government reversed the merger in 2010 and restored the Levies. This restoration again incurred additional costs, but the province had learned a key lesson: a top-down, one-size-fits-all approach does not work in a region as diverse and complex as Balochistan.

Levies are a locally accepted, cost-effective, and socially accountable force. Removing it to make way for a more expensive and less trusted force makes little sense

There are multiple reasons why merging the Levies with the police is not only unnecessary but also counterproductive. First and foremost is the financial burden. Maintaining a Levies force is significantly cheaper than maintaining a police force. The police have around 47,000 personnel and operate with an annual budget of Rs51 billion, covering an area of about 62,494 square kilometers. This means their cost per square kilometer is Rs821,396. In contrast, the Levies consist of about 27,000 personnel, operate with a budget of Rs22 billion, and cover a massive 284,696 square kilometers, more than four times the area the police cover. Their cost per square kilometer is just Rs79,781. That’s nearly ten times cheaper. Clearly, merging Levies into the police would skyrocket the province’s security expenses without any guaranteed improvement in outcomes.

What’s more surprising is that despite fewer resources, the crime rate in areas under Levies jurisdiction has historically been lower than in police-managed areas. This indicates that the Levies system is not only more economical but also more effective in many cases. This makes the argument for abolishing it even weaker.

Another major advantage of the Levies is their social accountability. Because Levies personnel are local residents, they are deeply integrated into the communities they serve. In a tribal and close-knit society like rural Balochistan, this means people know who their security personnel are and the personnel, in turn, are conscious of their reputation and relationships. This acts as a powerful check against misuse of authority. In contrast, the police often face serious allegations of corruption, including tampering with evidence and taking bribes. A study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) in 2020, conducted under the Rule of Law Road Map Project, found that citizens in Balochistan were more satisfied with the performance of Levies compared to other law enforcement agencies. This public trust must not be undermined lightly.

Another flawed argument made by proponents of the merger is that the Levies have failed to counter insurgency in the province. But it is important to clarify that neither the Levies nor the police are designed for counterinsurgency operations. That role is reserved for paramilitary forces like the Frontier Corps and the Army. Blaming the Levies for not handling insurgents is like blaming a firefighter for not conducting a heart surgery, it’s simply not their job.

Instead of dismantling the Levies Force, the government should focus on strengthening it. This includes better training, improved equipment, and increased oversight to tackle issues of corruption and inefficiency, just like with any other institution in Pakistan. Reforms should be aimed at capacity-building, not at elimination. Levies are a locally accepted, cost-effective, and socially accountable force. Removing it to make way for a more expensive and less trusted force makes little sense, especially for a province already struggling with financial and governance challenges.

Security challenges in Balochistan are real, but scapegoating the Levies will not solve them. The government must resist the temptation to use this narrative as a political smokescreen. Instead, it must focus on smarter, localised, and community-rooted solutions that work on the ground. The Levies are not the problem. In fact, in many ways, they are part of the solution. It’s time the government of Balochistan recognise that and acted accordingly.

Adnan Aamir is a journalist and political commentator based in Islamabad. He covers Pakistan for Nikkei Asia as the lead Contributing Writer. His areas of focus are the political economy in Pakistan, conflict in Balochistan, and Chinese interests in Pakistan. His X/Twitter handle is @iAdnanAamir. 

Scapegoating Levies For Security Failures In Balochistan

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